At stake is the whole question of nuclear nonproliferation
It would be interesting to elicit views on the Bush Administration's two-track approach to nuclear proliferation -- its sturdy promotion of selling nuclear technology to India -- notwithstanding critics in Congress and elsewhere -- and its escalating bellicosity toward Iran over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
There are striking similarities in the positions that both India and Iran have taken. Both insist that their nuclear plans are focused on meeting civilian needs. India's population of 1.1 billion is growing by 18 million annually -- it's like adding a new Australia each year. Iran's population, now 68 million, is growing by 1 million annually. Both countries contend that conventional energy sources -- fossil fuels -- will not suffice to service increasing domestic demands. Both countries say that new nuclear technology will not be used for military purposes.
Can both countries be believed?
Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty back in 1968, and ratified it two years later. India has refused to be a signatory, something that President Bush is willing to overlook, supposedly on the grounds that India, the world's largest democracy, has been a responsible player in the comity of nations. There is also the widespread assumption that American companies stand to make more than $100 billion through nuclear-technology sales to India in years to come. Surely Mr. Bush factored this into his calculus when he visited India last March, quite possibly the only country where, astonishingly, his approval ratings are in the stratosphere.
Of course, India already has nuclear bombs -- reportedly more than a dozen in its arsenal. It could conceivably build more, although the Indian government has privately assured Mr. Bush that it doesn't seek to be a nuclear expansionist. But in the Subcontinent, everything is determined by the political and cultural weather. India's neighbor, and rival for America's affections, Pakistan, also has the bomb. The secular Indians don't like this parity, not with an Islamic neighbor with a population of only 167 million; neither do the Indians relish the diplomatic and geopolitical parity that Washington has traditionally to both New Delhi and Islamabad, with an occasional tilt toward Pakistan when it suited America's security purposes.
Although Iranian President Ahmadinejad claims that building bombs isn't his aim, it stretches credulity to accept his assertion. Little wonder that the Bush Administration wants to apply economic sanctions on Iran, and possibly undertake military strikes.
So the nuclear game is being played out on two tracks: the India track, where Mr. Bush reached an agreement with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh under which American companies would sell nuclear fuel and hardware to India. Because India isn't a NPT signatory, Congress would need to approve the presidential agreement; the House of Representatives gave overwhelming approval last July, and just last week President Bush said that he would ask the outgoing Senate -- dominated by Republicans -- to endorse the agreement as well before its term expires at the end of this year.
The second track, of course, concerns what to do about Iran.
Several questions suggest themselves: Is the administration's two-track approach a two-faced one? Should India be subjected to stricter scrutiny of its nuclear facilities beyond what Mr. Bush and Mr. Singh agreed to earlier this year? Should Washington insist that India sign the NPT? Should the Indian military installations be subject to international inspection? Should India be required not to sell nuclear technology to Iran, a country with whom it has historically enjoyed cordial relations? What happens if India reneges on its informal commitment not to proceed with a Iran-Pakistan-India oil and gas pipeline? And with Democrats reported to be less enthusiastic than Mr. Bush about tightening Washington's bilateral embrace of India, are US-India relations going to be hostage to the caprice of the new Democratic Party-controlled Congress?
Finally, will Mr. Bush's two-track approach be converted into a one-track one in which the US-India economic and political corridor is collapsed into the broader architecture of handling Iran and its friends?